ESSAY

HOW SAUSAGE IS MADE: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND LOBBYING

DANIEL P. TOKAJI† & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE‡
“Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made.”
–Attributed to Otto von Bismarck, probably mistakenly1

INTRODUCTION
The constitutional law governing campaign finance regulation is back up
for grabs. The late Justice Antonin Scalia was an unwavering member of the
U.S. Supreme Court majority that cast a skeptical eye on all forms of
campaign finance regulation, save disclosure requirements. His death leaves
the remaining Justices sharply and evenly divided on the crucial question of
what government interests may justify campaign finance regulation. In
addition to Justice Scalia, the other justices who made up the majority—Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—take the position
that the only acceptable justification for restricting campaign contributions and
expenditures is to prevent the appearance or reality of corruption that stems from
the quid pro quo exchange of money for a political benefit.2 By contrast, the
dissenters—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—understand
corruption in a broader sense, one that includes the superior access and
influence that big donors and spenders may enjoy.3
† Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of Constitutional Law,
The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law.
‡ J.D., 2013, Yale Law School.
1 Steven Luxenberg, A Likely Story . . . and That’s Precisely the Problem, WASH. POST (Apr. 17,
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/16/AR2005041600154_pf.html
[https://perma.cc/3BVC-N5RZ].
2 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345, 356-61 (2010).
3 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466-68 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the anticorruption definition relied on by the majority does not take into account corruption “that
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If the Court is to embrace equality as a rationale for restricting the flow
of campaign dollars, it will require empirical research on how the current
system is actually functioning. Since Citizens United v. FEC, independent
expenditures have increased dramatically at the federal level, in terms of both
the total amount spent and the number of groups engaged in such spending.4
Yet relatively little is known about how this influx of outside spending affects
the process of governance. Our 2014 report The New Soft Money: Outside
Spending in Congressional Elections explored these topics,5 but much more work
remains to be done.
What became abundantly clear to us over the course of researching The
New Soft Money is that the money flowing into election campaigns is only half
the story. To understand its real-world impact, one must also understand
lobbying. For it is through the legislative and administrative process that
interest groups are able to pass government policies that benefit those who
donate to election campaigns. If campaign contributions and expenditures are
where an investment is made, then lobbying is where the payoff occurs. To
understand the current system of campaign finance, including the inequalities
of access and influence endemic to this system, we must also understand how
our lobbying system works.6
We would therefore disagree with Bismarck, were he actually responsible
for the sausages quotation. At this crossroads moment in the history of
campaign finance regulation, it is essential to understand how sausages—by
which we mean laws—are made. This requires engaging in careful study of
the relationship between what happens at the front end of the political
process, when campaign contributions and expenditures are made, and at the
back end, when the lobbying takes place. The remainder of this Essay sets
forth guidance on what that might mean for future researchers. First, we
review the theoretical concern that disparities in wealth cause inequalities of
political access and influence. Second, we discuss—based largely upon our
experience in writing The New Soft Money—the practical problems inherent
can destroy the link between public opinion and governmental action” and therefore is not consistent
with the Constitution).
4 See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE
SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 35 fig.4 (2014) [hereinafter TOKAJI & STRAUSE, THE
NEW SOFT MONEY] (highlighting that third-party expenditures for “express advocacy” for
congressional campaigns increased from $200 million in 2010 to $450 million in 2012).
5 See id. at 60-104 (exploring how outside spending affects how campaigns are run and
legislation is passed).
6 Several authors have focused on the relationship between campaign finance and lobbying. See
generally Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 105 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 213-16 (2012); Heather Gerken, Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, Keynote Address
(Nov. 12, 2011), in 27 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1155 (2011).
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in assessing the extent to which this theory manifests in reality, given the
ubiquity of money in both electoral campaigns and lobbying. Third, we propose
specific research projects that might address this empirical difficulty and
which would reveal how wealth disparities affect elections and governance.
I. THE THEORY: WHY MONEY MIGHT MATTER
For decades, scholars have debated the theories that might be used to
justify restrictions on expenditures and contributions.7 Countless gallons
of ink have been spilled on the question of whether the better justification
for such limits are based on anticorruption or egalitarian grounds, as
well as the different ways of defining these values. The Roberts Court has
narrowly defined the permissible basis for regulation. On the other hand,
pro-regulatory scholars have advanced broader rationales for limiting the flow
of money into political campaigns, some sounding in equality8 and others in
anticorruption.9
The only justification that the Supreme Court allows for restricting the
flow of money into political campaigns is to prevent the reality and
appearance of corruption. Following Burger and Rehnquist Court precedent,
most notably Buckley, the current Roberts Court has rejected equality as a
rationale that may justify restrictions on contributions or expenditures. The
Roberts Court’s primary difference from its predecessors is its narrow
definition of corruption, which it understands to be limited to the quid pro
quo exchange of money for political benefits. Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission is only the most highly publicized example of the Court’s

7 For a summary of this debate, see generally Renata E. B. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between
Access and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 179
(2014) [hereinafter Strause & Tokaji, Between Access and Influence].
8 See e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 186-89 (2016) (arguing that another
progressive Supreme Court justice is a solution which could undo the “disruption that the Court’s
[current anticorruption] campaign finance jurisprudence has done to . . . democracy”); Edward B.
Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1204, 1206 (1994) (advocating for a requirement of “equal-dollars-per-voter” instead of the Supreme
Court’s current prohibition of this principle).
9 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: THE CORRUPTION OF EQUALITY AND THE
STEPS TO END IT (2015) (describing the risk to U.S. democracy that results from a corrupt system
that does not recognize an equality of citizenship for all Americans); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On
Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 338 (1989)
(“What is controversial is not whether corrupt practices should be condemned, but whether certain
practices should be regarded as corrupt.”); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 398 (2009) (finding the anticorruption principle as held by the Founder’s is
an important guiding principle for constitutional interpretation).
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restrictive approach toward regulation.10 In its first decade, the Roberts
Court:
 struck down one state’s limits on individual contributions and
expenditures as too low,11
 rejected federal restrictions on electioneering communications,
except where they can only be reasonably understood as an appeal
to vote for or against a candidate,12
 disallowed Congress from increasing contribution limits for
candidates facing a wealthy, self-financed opponent,13
 struck down the federal ban on independent expenditures from
corporate treasury funds,14
 invalidated a state initiative that provided public funding based on
the private contributions and expenditures favoring privately
financed opponents,15
 summarily rejected a state ban on corporate independent
expenditures,16 and
 struck down a decades-old federal law limiting aggregate
contributions to all candidates, parties, and political committees.17
Throughout this period, five Justices have been unequivocally hostile to
all forms of campaign finance regulation except for disclosure requirements.
All but the first of these cases (Randall) were decided by a 5–4 margin and
Justice Scalia was part of the majority in every one. The Roberts Court
majority recognized only one acceptable interest that can justify restrictions
10
11

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006) (holding that a Vermont statute limiting
campaign expenditures and contributions was inconsistent with the First Amendment).
12 See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating a
lower court decision that upheld FEC’s application of the restrictions in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act to “grassroots lobbying advertisements”).
13 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744 (2008) (striking down a law that would allow new
donation limits for “non-self-financing candidate” if their self-financed opponent raised more than
$350,000 because it was “antithetical to the First Amendment”).
14 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that a statutory
limitation on independent expenditures by corporations was unconstitutional and would make
“political speech a crime”).
15 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011)
(finding no “sufficient justification” for an Arizona state law that provided additional matching funds
to a publically funded candidate).
16 Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
17 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448, 1462 (2014) (holding that aggregate limits on
campaign donations prevent individuals from exercising “expressive and associational rights”
without furthering the government’s interest in preventing corruption).
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on campaign contributions or expenditures: corruption or its appearance.
These justices define corruption narrowly, as consisting of only the quid
pro quo exchange of money for political benefits.18 The dissenting
justices—Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan—have taken a more deferential approach that is more generous in what
constitutes an allowable rationale for campaign contribution or expenditure
limitations.19 Although the dissenters have not expressly embraced equality
as a justification for contribution or expenditure limits, they have come close,
most notably in Davis v. FEC.20 The dissenting justices’ conception of
corruption has egalitarian undertones insofar as they accept the proposition
that the superior resources of wealthy donors and spenders may corrupt the
political process by resulting in disparities of political influence. Following
the Rehnquist Court’s opinion in McConnell v. FEC,21 a minority of justices
declared disparities of access and influence as an acceptable reason for
restricting the flow of money into political campaigns.22
We favor the explicit recognition of equality as a value that may justify
reasonable restrictions on both contributions and expenditures. There are, of
course, many different conceptions of equality. We think the most compelling
one is the principle sometimes referred to as “anti-plutocracy,”23 the idea that
wealthy individuals and interest groups should not enjoy disproportionate
influence in our democracy by virtue of their superior financial resources.
That said, we do not believe that there is a major practical difference between
the equality rationale we support and the broader anticorruption rationale
supported by some scholars and judges. As one of the leading supporters of a
broader anticorruption rationale recently acknowledged, both views
ultimately rest on the idea that all of us are equal citizens whose voice in
democracy ought not be determined by our wealth.24
18 See id. at 1441 (“Any regulation must instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’
corruption or its appearance.”).
19 See id. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that anticorruption encompasses a broader
interest in “maintaining the integrity of our public governmental institutions”).
20 See 554 U.S. 724, 755 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(recognizing an interest in “reducing both the influence of wealth on the outcomes of elections, and
the appearance that wealth alone dictates those results”).
21 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
22 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have firmly established
that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to
curbing undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”)
23 See generally HASEN, supra note 8 (advocating for campaign finance regulations that promote
equality instead of pushing the United States towards a plutocracy); Foley, supra note 8 (arguing for
adoption of an equal-dollars-per-voter principle to create equal financial influence among votes).
24 Lawrence Lessig, Frequently Asked Questions, LESSIG, https://lessig2016.us/faq/ [https://
perma.cc/AV7U-XPFV], (“I have come to see that the reason the system is ‘corrupt’ is because it
denies a fundamental equality of citizens.”).
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The anticorruption-versus-equality debate has effectively reached its
conclusion, at least as an academic matter. Whether one embraces the equality
rationale or favors a broader anticorruption rationale, the basic idea is the
same: the superior access and influence of wealthy interests can justify
campaign finance regulation. This shared understanding of the justification
for regulation affords reformers an opportunity to focus on a more pressing
problem: demonstrating that the proposition that wealthy individuals and
groups in fact do enjoy superior access and influence is indeed the reality.
Advocates of reform should therefore set aside the theoretical debate in order
to engage in an empirical assessment of the effects that present-day
independent spending is actually having on elections and governance.25 Using
both qualitative and quantitative tools, researchers should document what is
actually happening on the ground. This evidence is essential not only to
determine whether or not the theory (or theories) supporting regulation are
actually based in reality, but to craft both the next generation of campaign
finance reforms.
II. THE PROBLEM:
DOCUMENTING DISPARITIES OF ACCESS AND INFLUENCE
Most Americans intuitively sense that the money spent on campaigns
affects public policy outcomes. According to a 2015 New York Times poll,
fifty-five percent of respondents think candidates who win public office often
promote policies that directly help the people and groups who donated money
to their campaigns.26 The same poll found that sixty-six percent believe
wealthy Americans have a greater chance of influencing the electoral process
than other Americans.27 Intuition, however, is not enough to make a case. If
disparities of access and influence are to be accepted as a rationale for
campaign contribution or expenditure limits, courts will require evidence that
they actually exist.
Developing an evidentiary record to support the next generation of
campaign finance regulation will be challenging for four reasons. First, it will
require overcoming the presumption of stare decisis. For four decades since
the Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo, it has been the law that it is
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment” to limit the voice of some in order
25 By “governance,” we mean the impact of campaign contributions and expenditures on public
policy, including legislation. As we have explained elsewhere, the analytic framework that the Court
applied during the McConnell era allowed for consideration of campaign money’s influence on
governance—in particular, the superior access and influence that soft money donors enjoyed. Strause
& Tokaji, Between Access and Influence, supra note 7, at 196-210.
26 Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html [https://perma.cc/P63T-RPFP].
27 Id.
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to enhance the voice of others.28 A more tolerant approach to regulation will
require the Court to overrule precedent, either by expressly adopting an
equality rationale (the course we favor) or by broadening the definition of
corruption to include disparities in access and influence, the course followed
in Austin and McConnell.29 To overrule the presumption of stare decisis the
volume of evidence that advocates will have to muster will be higher.30
Second, there have been major changes in the world of campaign finance
since the last generation of reform. When Congress adopted the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, its central concerns were the “soft money”
flowing through the political parties and electioneering communications
masquerading as “issue ads,” both of which were vehicles for evading federal
contribution restrictions.31 The issues of today are quite different. Today’s
central concern is the vastly increased amount of money flowing through
groups other than the political parties in the form of independent
expenditures,32 which we have termed “the new soft money.”
Our research suggests that the new soft money functions quite differently
from the old soft money.33 While both the old and the new soft money
influence policy, they operate through different mechanisms. The old soft
money was like a hundred-dollar bill slipped to the nightclub bouncer to pass
through velvet ropes, a means by which wealthy interests could ensure that
public officials’ doors would be open to their lobbying efforts. The new soft
money is more like a menacing bulge in one’s jacket pocket. It is a threat that
adverse consequences, in the form of independent spending against an
incumbent legislator, will follow if a wealthy interest group’s lobbying
demands are denied. Although The New Soft Money consistently found that
this outside spending functions as a, usually implied, threat, much more
research needs to be done to assess how outside campaign spending influences

28
29

424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149-50 (2003) (“Our cases have firmly established that
Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing
undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”), overruled in
part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) (holding that Michigan’s limit on corporate political expenditures was
narrowly tailored to prevent the undermining of the political process’s integrity), overruled by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
30 Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“The justifications for the case system and stare decisis must rest upon the Court’s capacity, and
responsibility, to acknowledge its missteps. It is our duty to face up to adverse, unintended
consequences flowing from our own prior decisions.”).
31 TOKAJI & STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY, supra note 4, at 13.
32 Id. at 35.
33 Id. at 2 (concluding that the reality of campaign financing has changed since prior Court
decisions and statutory enactments).
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policy in the current regime. The next section attempts to sketch out these
research needs.
Third, the relationship between campaign finance and lobbying needs to
be studied more comprehensively. The difficulty in establishing this
relationship arises from the pervasiveness of money in our political
system—at both the front end (electing candidates) and the back end (making
policy). As Professors Pam Karlan and Sam Issacharaoff famously
hypothesized, political money is like water—when prevented from flowing in
one direction, it will naturally flow in another.34 It is also like water in that it
is a ubiquitous element in our political ecosystem, including both election
campaigns and policy debates. Understanding the entire ecosystem is key to
the success of reforms that seek to reduce inequalities of access and influence.
For example, it is simply not enough to study the impacts of spending by
“Super PACs” and non-profit organizations, reformers must understand how
these new players relate to the old institutions of political parties and
leadership PACs. Proponents of reform must understand that relationships
between members of Congress and lobbyists are formed and maintained more
subtly than simply providing direct campaign contributions. And the deepest
possible dive must be taken into the legislative process, to illuminate
congressional actions marked by low public salience and high donor demand.
In short, reformers must prepare to paint a broad yet detailed picture of our
campaign finance and lobbying systems to show how spending influences both
elections and governance.
Finally, an evidence-based approach to campaign finance reform must
meet the challenge of showing that any future proposed restriction is
appropriately tailored. Even if a court can be persuaded to adopt an equality
rationale as a basis for regulation, proving the appropriate means–end fit will
be no small burden.35 As such, the project of amassing evidence to support
the regulation should begin long before litigation is filed, and even before
legislation is considered.
This leads to the most important question of all. What sort of research
would reveal the impact that campaign spending is having on both elections
and governance? As we have previously argued, the evidence that was offered
in McConnell v. FEC provides a useful model.36 But it is essential to refine
34 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“First, we think political money, like water, has to go somewhere. It
never really disappears into thin air.”).
35 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 166-74 (2003) (indicating that once the Court accepts
the undue influence anticorruption rationale at the beginning, the tailoring of the challenged
provision is then examined), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
36 TOKAJI & STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY, supra note 4, at 74-76 (exploring the
evidence in the McConnell case that was relied upon to show the influence of “soft money”).
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that model, if we are to assess how the current system is working. We now
turn to specifics of what that research might look like.
III. THE SOLUTION:
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND LOBBYING
For those reformers that advocate for egalitarian campaign finance
restrictions, the most urgent challenge is to gather detailed evidence
regarding the effects of campaign spending on both elections and governance.
Qualitative examinations regarding the impact of economic inequalities on
policy outcomes are central to this research agenda. In other words,
researchers should lay their theoretical disagreements aside, and focus their
efforts on how the sausages are made. Relying on our experience in
researching and writing The New Soft Money, below we offer our suggestions
on what that research might look like.
Our proposed agenda starts with conversations with legislators, preferably
on the record. Researchers should ask legislators about their sources of
information on particular issues and who they listen to as informal advisors.
Do campaign donors play a role in raising issues to a legislator’s attention? If
so, what relationship do donors have with the legislator’s process of gathering
and sorting information in policymaking? Does the same hold true for donors
who give not only to the legislator directly, but to institutional players such
as Super PACs and parties?
Researchers should also explore more fully a topic we touched on in The
New Soft Money: threats of independent spending. Do legislators perceive
there to be threats that outside money will be spent against them if they take
certain positions? Are such threats ever made directly and if not, how are they
communicated to the legislators? What about promises of help via
independent spending?
In addition to legislators, researchers should talk to major donors and
small-dollar donors. Why do they choose to spend money on political
campaigns? Is there a difference in motivation between low-dollar donors and
high-dollar donors? Do they expect anything in return for their money and if
so, what? Is there a difference between what is expected in return for a direct
donation to a candidate and a donation to a Super PAC supporting just that
one candidate? Do the donors receive “thank yous,” either officially or through
back-channels, from the candidates for Super PAC donations?
Lobbyists are another key source of information, whether on the record
or off the record. Much like the novels by former CIA agents that illuminate
the tools of spycraft, interviews with retired lobbyists may be a fertile starting
ground for understanding the tricks of the trade for developing and
maintaining relationships with legislators and their staffs. In particular,
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lobbyists could be critical to understanding the relationship between
fundraising and agenda-setting by committees, such as in the timing of
donations relative to hearings on a particular regulated community.
Along with lobbyists, other institutional players should be interviewed.
Organizations that fund Super PACs and other vehicles for independent
spending should be questioned. Are all dollars spent for ideological reasons
or is there pressure from lawmakers to fund such efforts? Is spending money
a necessary condition for having a seat at the policymaking table?
Finally, researchers should talk to staff—both campaign and official—whenever
possible. Even if conversations must be off-the-record to start, staff will often
hold the keys to understanding how the flow of campaign money makes its
way to governance.
CONCLUSION
The above ideas are meant to be preliminary and suggestive, aimed at
spurring debate and refinement. Our most important point, one on which we
hope there will be general agreement, is that there is a pressing need for
qualitative research on how increased outside spending affects both elections
and governance. One lesson from our experience in writing The New Soft
Money is that it can be very difficult to persuade insiders to open up, especially
those who are wary of campaign finance reform. It is therefore important
that researchers ask the right questions, and that legislators, staff, donors,
and major political players do their best to answer them. Finally, it is
crucial—though extremely difficult in this hotly contested realm—that
ideology not cloud methodology. Researchers who hypothesize, as we do, that
economic inequalities cause inequalities of access and influence must strive
to describe the world as it is, not simply as we would like it to be for the
purpose of advancing our own policy agenda.
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